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A LETTER TO THE Paris Gazetteer, UPON THE SIEGE AND TAKING OF NAMUR.

By the Author of the *Safety* of *Europe*.

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A

LETTER

TO THE

Paris Gazetteer

Upon the Taking of

NAMUR.

SIR,

YOU will undoubtedly ſtand in need of all your Wit, to put a handſom gloſs in your *Gazettes* upon the Taking of *Namur*. It is attended with ſo many mortifying Circumſtances for your Court, which not only your Enemies and your Allies,

 but

but your own People are perfectly well acquainted with, that notwithſtanding all your Skill in diſguiſing the truth, and the long Experience you have added to your natural Tallents to make your ſelf Maſter of that Art, it will prove a hard Task for you to impoſe upon the World on that Subject.

Though your Nation is fam'd for making a great deal of noiſe for a very ſmall matter, and for exalting its leaſt Advantages up to the Skies, I believe I may be allow'd to ſay, that no *Frenchman* ever ſtrain'd that Character to ſuch a height as you have done. With what Emphaſis did not you cry up the Glory of having made new Lines in *Flanders*, to cover thoſe places of yours which were moſt expos'd. That Evidence of your Weakneſs and Fear has receiv'd the ſame Eulogies from your Pen, as you had given before to your greateſt Conqueſts; and as if the Miniſters of your Crown were proud of being the Eccho's of a poor Gazetteer: they talk'd of thoſe Lines in the Northern Courts, as of an inpenetrable Bulwork, which would ſecure *France* againſt all the Endeavours of her Enemies. *The Confederates*, ſaid thoſe Gentlemen, *will be convinc'd at laſt, that they can expect nothing from the con-*

continuation of the War but the ruin of their People, and the exhauſting of their Treaſures: They will find the utmoſt Efforts of their Arms uſeleſs in the Low-Countries, *where they have their moſt formidable Armies and where they are Commanded by a Prince who is the Head and Soul of their League.* Theſe Diſcourſes ſeaſon'd with ſome forc'd Reflections upon the immenſe Sums which the Poll-Tax was to have produced, together with the fair Appearances they had in *France* of a fertile Year, were the perpetual common places of the converſation of thoſe great Miniſters, who ſeem'd to have no Inſtructions, but your Gazettes.

Confeſs, Sir, that at that time you were very far from believing that the Confederates were in a Condition, to perform ſo great an Enterprize as that of the Siege of *Namur* ſucceſsfully, and that it was not without the utmoſt aſtoniſhment, your Court receiv'd the News of our having a deſign upon that place. It is true that your ſurpriſe ſoon gave way to the flattering hopes of ſeeing that great deſign miſcary, upon the account of the great obſtacles which could not fail of rendring the Execution of it difficult, and by reaſon of the potent Diverſion which you did propoſe to make in *Flanders*. *The*

Prince of Orange, ſaid your Emiſſaries in all parts, *performs an Act of Deſpair, this project of his ſavours of ſomething beyond Raſhneſs, and his Allies will ſoon diſcover the Vanity of the hopes he endeavours to feed them with.*

Without doubt you did not conſider that in daily repreſenting the vaſt difficulties of the enterpriſe, you heighten'd the Glory of the Succeſs; but beſides your being perſuaded that the Confederates would miſcarry in it, you could not have the confidence to talk of the Seige of *Namur*, as of a deſign of ſmall Importance, after having made ſo great a Noiſe throughout all *Europe* of the taking of that Place, when you took it from the *Spaniards*.

It is ſufficiently known, that of all his Conqueſts your King valued himſelf moſt upon that. Of all the Sieges he has made in Perſon, none ever coſt him ſo much time, nor has any acquir'd ſo much Reputation to his Arms. And yet you muſt needs grant that he had not the third part of thoſe Obſtacles to overcome, which our great Prince has now Triumph'd over.

Your

Your Frontiers were defended by ſuch ſtrong Places, and thoſe ſo well provided every way, that you had certainly no manner of Diverſions to fear when you beſieg'd *Namur*. Your Army of oppoſition was ſuperiour to that with which we might have endeavoured the relief of it. It was not oblig'd to keep at a diſtance from that which was employed at the ſiege, ſince your Country was ſecure, and thus your two Armies made but one, and were at liberty to aſſiſt each other mutually at all times. Add to this the advantage of the Poſts, in which you could not be attacked without raſhneſs, the weakneſs of the Garriſons, the ill condition of the place, which was commanded on the ſide of St. *Nicholas*, where you have made new Fortifications ſince, and the little care that was taken of tranſporting into the Caſtle the Beer, Brandy, and the other Proviſions which are neceſſary to animate a Souldier to make a vigorous Reſiſtance.

We have found all things in a very different Condition from this. You are ſenſible that 80 Battallions are hardly ſufficient to guard the line of Circumvallation of the Town and Caſtle of *Namur*, ſince it requires 3 ſeparate Camps, and contains 5 Leagues Circumferrence. Therefore

the King of *England* being neceſſitated to employ ſuch a vaſt body of Foot, could leave no Army in *Flanders*, but ſuch a one as was very inferior to the Mareſchal *de Villeroy*'s. The diſtance from thoſe two Armys did not permit that which was before *Namur*, to ſend any ſuccors to the other. Nevertheleſs that Army was obliged to cover large Towns which were either quite open, or ill Fortify'd. This was undoubtedly ſufficient to flatter your Court with the hopes of a conſiderable Diverſion, and even with the gain of a deciſive Battle.

The News which was brought to *Verſailles*, that Prince *Vaudemont* tarry'd for the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* in the Camp of *Wouterghem*, prepared every body to receive an account of his defeat: They argued before hand upon the advantagious Conſequences of a Victory which they look'd upon as certain, and it was not without the utmoſt Indignation againſt the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* the Court was inform'd, that in his preſence, and when he look'd upon his game as certain, Prince *Vaudemont* had made a retreat towards *Ghent*, worthy of the Admiration of the moſt Experienc'd Generals.

It is moſt certain that had this Prince haſten'd his retreat towards *Ghent* but one day before, the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* loſing the hopes of fighting him, might have fallen upon *Bruges* or *Newport*; but Prince *Vaudemont* making a feint to come to Action, filled his Enemies head ſo full with thecare of a Battle which ſeem'd to be at hand, that after his Glorious Retreat in view of your Forces, he had time enough to provide for the ſafety of the Places which were threaten'd, and to cover them by a Detachment which the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* was very much ſurpriſed to find when he drew near thoſe Places.

This ſecond diſgrace oblig'd him to reſt ſatisfied with the taking of *Dixmuyde* and *Deynſe*, Towns which he has not been able to keep, and of which he cauſed the Fortifications immediately to be deſtroy'd; beſides that thoſe Garriſons ſurrendring themſelves Priſoners of War, without any Defence, that Conqueſt has acquired no Honour to your Arms, and has only ſerved to diſcover your Breach of Faith, which you have given freſh proofs of in forcing our Men to liſt themſelves, and in refuſing to ſend them back again to us, by a manifeſt infraction of the *Cartel*.

If a Prince *de Vaudemont* were neceſſary to defend *Flanders*, we may well be allowed to ſay that none leſs than a Prince ſo Powerful, ſo reſolute, and ſo Brave as His Majeſty of *Great Britain*, was neceſſary to overcome all the Obſtacles which ſeem'd to render the taking of *Namur* impoſſible.

Namur was no longer a Town lyable to be taken in Five or Six days time by its weak ſide. The Eminence which did command that Place, was ſecured and covered by your New Fortifications. There were four Redoubts well lin'd, in which you had Guns, which were ſo cloſely covered by the Top of the Rock, that they were hardly viſible but from the Town. Each of theſe Redoubts had a ſtrong Counterſcarp, and were altogether covered by a double *Envelope* of well Palliſſado'd Retrenchments. It was abſolutely neceſſary to force your Men out of thoſe Retrenchments in order to draw near to the Town, where you had not forgot to make new Works alſo; inſomuch that before our Forces could come to the Baſtion of St. *Nicholas*, and to the Demy Baſtion of St. *Roch*, they met with two Counterſcarps fi'lld with little Trenches, a Countre-guard well lin'd,

lin'd, an Earthen Ravelin, and a Dam which kept the water within the Ditch; all these works cover'd the new Wall of the Town, after which one met the old Wall, which was divided from the new one by a very broad and very deep Ditch. If this was the weak side of the Town, what may we not judge of the rest, especially of the Fortifications of the Castle? Besides, the Old Tower, its two Walls and the Fort of *Terra Nova* which were very well repair'd, they had enlarged and perfected the Fort of *Coehorn*, within which they had made several *Traverses*, and in order to cover the place through which you had formerly taken that Fort, and at the same time to secure its Communication with that of *Terra Nova*, they had built between the two extremitys of those Works a great Redoubt lin'd and *Casemated*. Besides all this they had improved the Casotte very much. All these Forts had good Cavities, they were defended by a double Counterscarp well Pallissado'd, and they had Communications from one to another, with good cover'd Ways. In fine, beyond all these Works, one met with a large Ditch designed to cover them, which was cut into the Rock with prodigeous Labour and Expence,

and which extended almoſt from the *Meuſe* to the *Sambre*.

I own, Sir, that all thoſe different Poſts requir'd abundance of Men to guard them; and you cannot deny but that you had a whole Army in *Namur*; inſomuch that beſides all the Works I have mention'd, you poſted your ſelves in the Subburb of *Jambe*, the Houſe of the *Ballance*, and the Abby of *Salſines*. That was eaſy for you to do, ſince that according to the Calculation of your *Gazett* of the *9th.* of *July* (which contrary to your uſual Cuſtom is very true in that particular) your Garriſon conſiſted of 8 Regiments of Dragoons and 21 Battallions, including the free Companys. You had alſo abundance of Gunners and Miners, 16 choſen Ingeneers, and at their head, Monſieur *Megrini* ſecond Engeneer of *France*. Add to all this a great number of Officers of Note, ſeveral Volunteers who ſought occaſions to Signalize themſelves, a brave and Vigilent Governor, belov'd by his Garriſon, and eſteem'd by his Enemies, laſtly a Mareſchal of *France*, whom you look upon as one of the greateſt Captains of the Age.

This

This numerous Garriſon neither wanted Money nor Proviſions, nor Warlike Ammunitions. There were upwards of a hundred Guns in the Town and Caſtle, ſeveral Mortars, 13 Hundred Thouſands of Powder, 10000 Muskets of change, Bombs, Granado's and Bullets without Number; in a word, you had all manner of Proviſions for upwards of ſix Months.

What a prodigious Army was required to form ſo many Sieges as were included in the bare Siege of *Namur*? How many Mortars and Bombs were neceſſary to be ſent for? How many Pioneers were requir'd? Indeed, Sir, if all theſe conſiderations join'd to the great Forces, the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* had with him do not prevail with you to confeſs that the ſecond Siege of *Namur* is quite different from the firſt; I own that I have nothing more to ſay to you, and that I deſpair of proving to you that the Sun ſhines at Noon day.

I do not wonder conſidering all theſe circumſtances, that Mareſchal *de Boufflers* ſhould look upon His Majeſty's Enterprize, as a piece of Raſhneſs. The whole Garriſon had the ſame Opinion, untill the attack of *Coquelet*, in which a double Retrenchment well Palliſſado'd and Defend-

ed by 5000 of your beſt Men, who could every Moment receive freſh Succors from the City, were not capable to ſtop the Eagerneſs of our Infantry. The reſiſtence of your Men, the mines and *Fougæs* which they ſprung only ſerv'd to animate ours the more, who remain'd maſters of the Retrenchments, and purſued thoſe who guarded them to the very Counterſcarp of the City. After that attack, all thoſe we made, had ſuch good ſucceſs, that we had reaſon to queſtion whither the Conſternation of your Forces had not almoſt as great a ſhare in it, as the Bravery of ours. The beſieged made neither Sallies nor any other Vigorous Actions. We took with little loſs both the firſt and ſecond Counterſcarp, the Counter-guard, and the Dam. We made our ſelves maſters of the Abby of *Salſines*, and of the Houſe of the *Ballances*, which were Poſts of great conſequence for the attack of the Caſtle, in which we met but with very little Reſiſtance. In ſhort, we drove the *French* out of the great Retrenchment cut into of the Rock, without loſing any Men in that Action except a few of thoſe who were a little too eager in the purſuit of them.

So many ſucceſſes aſtoniſhed the beſieged, and oblig'd them to ſurrender the Town before we had made

made our ſelves maſters of the *Ravelin*, or of any of the Baſtions of the firſt Wall. This event enabled his Majeſty to ſend a conſiderable Reinforcement to the Prince *de Vaudemont*. But as I have more ſincerity than you, I will own that that Reinforcement could not come ſoon enough to prevent the Bombardment of *Bruſſells*. The Mareſchal *de Villeroy* had already made himſelf maſter of Poſts in order to the Execution of that Enterprize, out of which it was impoſſible to force him. I will examine in another Letter, whether *France* has acquir'd much Honour and Advantage by that Expedition. Permit me, Sir, at preſent to return before the Caſtle of *Namur*, which Mareſchal *de Boufflers* ſeconded by Monſieur *de Megrini* did propoſe to defend much longer than he had done the Town, expecting no leſs than to force us to raiſe the Siege.

He did ground thoſe hopes chiefly on the poſitive aſſurances your Court gave him of a ſpeedy Relief. And indeed that deſign was become publick. They talked of the ſuccors of *Namur* at *Verſailles*, as of an infallible thing: and the people reckon'd already that this new ſucceſs of their King's Arms would oblige the Confederates to ſue to him for a Peace. All things were

in motion in the Kingdom for the Execution of that great Project. A Detachment form the Army of *Germany*, the Forces of the Coaſts, the Guards and Mouſqueteers which had been kept for the Guard of the King's Perſon, the Arriere Ban, the Militia, all in a word, even the very Guards eſtabliſhed for the Subſides of the Salt marched to the ſame Rendezvouſe. The Mareſchal *de Villeroy* proud of thoſe Reinforcements, advances towards *Gemblours*, with a train of Artillery conſiſting of a hundred pieces of Cannon. 'Tis given out that he has poſitive orders to fight the Confederates whatever Poſt he finds them in. The *French* talk with all the confidence imaginable, of the ſucceſs of the Battle he is going to Fight. They give out every where, that he is going to relieve *Namur* at the head of a 100 Thouſand Men. The Prayers of fourty Hours are order'd more for form-ſake, than out of any doubt of the Event. They ſtudy before hand what ſiege they ſhall form, after having raiſed that of *Namur*. In a word, the two Armys are in ſight of each other, and the great Day appears on which the Fate of *Europe* is to be decided. How many Fathers are going to Weep for the loſs of their Children, and Wives for their Husbands? But let them lay aſide their Fears, and let the Prudence

of

of Mareſchal *de Villeroy* ſecure them. If he be within ſight of our Army, he is the better able to judge the Impoſibility of attacking it. He diſcovers the wiſe precautions our Great King has taken to fortify the Avenues of his Camp; and whilſt he hears 160 pieces of Ordinance, and 40 Mortars thunder againſt the Caſtle of *Namur*, he without Intermiſſion ſees that our Army of Oppoſition has above a 100 Guns in Battery to receive him, and that being almoſt equal to his in Number of Men, it muſt be conſider'd as ſuperior to it by the Advantage of the Poſt.

It is not therefore to be wondered at that he ſhould retire without Fighting at the ſight of ſo many difficulties. Neither is he juſtly to be blam'd for his Retreat; but the Noiſe which your Court has ſo unſeaſonably made of the great deſign which they had projected is to be condemn'd. What will all *Europe* ſay which expected the event of that Important Criſis? What will the *Northern* Crowns think who had been prepar'd for a very different ſucceſs by your Miniſters? What will your People ſay in the juſt dread of ſeeing a Continuation of the War by the Repugnancy which your Court will doubtleſs have to conſent to the new pretentions which the Conqueſt of *Namur* does authoriſe

riſe us to form? What will even your Court ſay to excuſe the Confidence where with they have ſpoken of the relief of that place? Were they ignorant of the force of the Poſts were they pretended their Army was to force us? Were they not informed of the precautions we might take to preſerve them? Had they a falſe Idea of our Forces? I own, that if they have really thought them to be as conſiderably leſſen'd as your Gazettes have publiſhed it, they had reaſon to believe that we were no longer in a Condition to make head againſt the Mareſchal *de Villeroy*. In Truth, Sir, this is a diſmal paſſage for you; thoſe who will give themſelves the trouble to calculate to what the loſs amounts, which you pretend we have ſuſtained before the Town or Caſtle of *Namur*, will find that it amounts to upwards of 40000 Men killed or Wounded. I could eaſily prove it to you by a faithful extract of each of your Gazetts of the Months of *July*, *Auguſt* and *September*, but that would be a uſeleſs trouble ſince they are in the hands of every Body. Moreover it is certain that our Army of oppoſition, and that which was employed at the Siege, did not conſiſt of more than one Hundred Thouſand effective Men, even after the arrival of the Detachment from *Germany*. This is alſo a fact, the

riſe

truth of which is to be found in your Gazetts, when you make the Calculation of our Battallions and of our Squadrons. Of theſe 100000 there were but 70000 Foot, out of which we muſt bate near 30000 which the Siege had already coſt us according to your Reckoning, when the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* drew near to fight us. His march towards the *Mehaign*, did not make us diſcontinue the Siege, to the carrying on of which, about 20000 Foot remained conſtantly imployed; inſomuch that on the 30*th.* of *Auguſt* we gave a general Aſſault to the Works of the Caſtle with 15000 men, as you relate it in your Gazette of the 10*th.* of *September*, ſo that our Army, beſides the Cavalry which was of no uſe for the defence of our Retrenchments, could not according to your Calculation exceed the number of 20000 Foot. Give me leave to tell you, Sir, that you have but little regard to the Mareſchal *de Villeroy*'s Reputation. What? with 120 Battallions gathered from the four corners of the Kingdom, he contents himſelf with barely viewing lines made in haſt, and only defended by 20000 Men, whom he has a poſitive order to attack? He ſuffers a Place to be taken before his Face of ſuch Importance to his King, the Garriſon of which deſerves ſo well to be ſuccor-

ed by the Noble Defence you ſay they have made? But that is not all yet. You add in the ſame Gazett of the 10*th.* of *September*, that the 15000 Men which had given the Aſſault on the 30*th.* of *Auguſt*, being repulſed with the loſs of near 6000, we made a ſecond Aſſault on the 1ſt. of *September* with 20000 Men. Without doubt, Sir, thoſe that were remaining of the 15000 men which made the attack on the 30*th.* of *Auguſt*, were too much diſheartened, and too much fatigu'd to make a new Aſſault two days after it. Therefore the 20000 Men which were imploy'd on that new attack, muſt of neceſſity be taken out of our Army of Oppoſition, at leaſt the major part of them. And thus this Army is reduc'd to nothing, and I defy you, according to your Calculation, to find 6000 Foot remaining there. Nevertheleſs the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* is preſent with 100000 men without endeavouring to improve ſo favourable an Occaſion, and though as you ſay, we have 9000 men killed and wounded in this 2*d.* Aſſault, and are repulſed every where, Monſieur *de Boufflers* deſires to capitulate that very day, and Monſieur *de Villeroy* retires the very next towards *Mons* with the utmoſt Speed. Do not you fancy, Sir, in reading this, that Miracles are not ceaſed, and that all this has been done by Inchantment? There-

Therefore it follows of neceſſity, either that the Mareſchal *de Villeroy* is the moſt unworthy General that ever was, or that you are a great Romancer without Truth or Judgment. I am very apt to believe, Sir, the ſtorm will fall upon your own head. The Capitulation of *Namur* is a ſad Commentary for your Gazetts, and I am of Opinion that many men will curſe you for the diſappointment of the hopes they had built upon your falſe Relations.

As for the Mareſchal *de Villeroy*, it will be eaſy for him to juſtifie himſelf, and to prove that while we gave a general Aſſault to the Caſtle with 10000 men (and not with 15000 as you relate it) we had 95 good Battallions and upwards of 200 Squadrons behind the Lines which he was ordered to force, he will proye that he could not give a Battle without expoſing his Army to an abſolute Defeat, and that he was in the right not to hazard the ſucceſs of ſo raſh an Enterpriſe.

But that which in my Opinion, Sir, is of moſt dangerous conſequence for you, is, That ſome Fool or other may chance to have a Crotchet to

make a Deſcription of the Siege of *Namur*, exactly according to the relation of your Gazetts. That would certainly afford a large field to turn you into redicule; for inſtance, it would be eaſily prov'd, that in the Aſſault of the 30*th.* of *Auguſt*, our Forces were not repulſed every where ſince they took the Counterſcarp of the Caſtle, and that of the *Cochorn* Fort, and that they lodged themſelves at the foot of the Breach of that laſt Work, which oblig'd the beſieged to Capitulate within two days after it. It would be eaſy to convince you that you muſt bate upwards of 4000 of the 6000 men which you pretend we loſt on that occaſion. Monſieur *de Boufflers* himſelf could witneſs that there was no attack at all the 1*ſt.* of *September*, and that nothing happen'd conſiderable that Day, but his deſire to Capitulate. And therefore, *that the ſecond Aſſault* which you mention, *made by* 20000 *Men, which coſt us* 9000 *Men and you* 3000, *and in which the ſlaughter was ſo great, that there has been none like it*, as you ſay, in *Europe for upwards of an Age*; is nothing but a fiction of your Brain, and ſo poorly invented, that no Man of common Sence could ever be perſuaded that our Army of Oppoſition ſhould have weakened it ſelf by ſo conſiderable a Detachment, at a time when they were ſtill Lyable

able to be attacked by yours. We could make you ſenſible how ridiculous it is to ſay that the beſieged had the Advantage of the Sally they made the Night between the 19*th.* and 20*th.* of *Auguſt*, in which you maintain that they ruin'd divers Works towards the end of the Trenches, and that they routed thoſe who did defend them, whereas they were repulſed themſelves, and purſued as far as the Counterſcarp of *Coehorn* Fort, where they retired in diſorder, not having been able to ſuſtain the Vigour wherewith they were charged by the *Spaniſh* Dragoons, whoſe Bravery our Chiefs did Reward, by giving each Dragoon two Piſtols, and advancing the Officers who did command them, which is a convincing proof that we had reaſon to be pleaſed with the ſucceſs of that Action. Neither can I omit to obſerve that the other Sallys which you make ſo much noiſe about, have never exceeded 30 or 40 Men, who after having made a Diſcharge at a great diſtance towards the place where they heard our men at Work, retir'd immediately into their Forts. It would be eaſy to demonſtrate to you that the attack of the Retrenchments of the Caſtle in which you make us loſe ſeveral Thouſand Men, did not coſt us above 200, who in the heat of the purſuit advanced as far as the Counterſcarp of your Works.

Works. But what might not one ſay about *the Aſſault which was made*, as you ſay, *on the 25th. of* Auguſt *by* 12000 *Men, who having attacked the Cazotte and the* Coehorn *Fort were repulſed three ſeveral times*, and of which 4 or 5000 were killed wounded or taken? With what confuſion would you be forced to own that the ſaid attack was wholly of your own invention, and that it muſt be reduced to the taking of a ſmall Redout, in which we took a Lieutenant and 16 Soldiers, without loſing above three of ours. That which is moſt Blame-worthy in your Behaviour, is that you never diſabuſe the Reader in your Gazetts of the falſities you have impoſed upon him in the preceeding, and that on the contrary you continue to ſuppoſe that they are all Truths which are not in the leaſt to be queſtioned.

In looking back on the Siege of the Town we ſhould find ſeveral other Examples like theſe of Impudence and Diſingenuity. You ſuppoſe an imaginary attack on the Eminence of *Bouge* the Night between the 12*th.* and 13*th.* of *July. We loſt* 500 *Men there at the firſt on-ſet*, according to your Calculation, *and being*, as you ſay, *returned to the Attack with ſix Battallions, the beſieged abandoned that Poſt; but having ſoon after it put fire to the Bombs and Gra-*

Granado's which they had buryed there, and falling upon the Confederates with Sword in Hand, they beat them out of it, and killed upwards of 900 Men, and did not loſe above 4 or 5 Soldiers themſelves. In Truth, when Men of Sence read things like theſe, they are at a loſs to think which is the moſt ſurpriſing, to find that there are Writers who have Impudence enough to tell them, or to ſee that there are Readers ſo credulous as to believe them. For every one knows that there was no Attack the Night between the 12*th.* and 13*th.* of *July*, and that the firſt of all was that of the 18*th.* which you have not had much reaſon to boaſt of; ſince your men were driven out of the Retrenchments they had on the Eminence of *Bouge*, and that ours lodged themſelves there. It is moſt certain that this Vigorous Action did not coſt us 1500 men, and that your Garriſon loſt upwards of 2000 there. Nevertheleſs allowing your diſingenous way of relating that Action, according to your wonted cuſtom, it is amazing to think, that an Army ſo conſiderably weakn'd as you ſuppoſe ours to have been in that Action, ſhould have been capable to continue the Siege, and to make ſo many other Attacks, and ſo much the more ſeeing that in the Sally which the beſieged made that day upon the Trenches of the *Brandenburghers*, you make

us

us loſe 1200 Men. It is true that they muſt be reduced to leſs than 200, and that thoſe who made the Sally did not loſe much leſs in making their Retreat, but that is a Circumſtance you have thought fit to ſuppreſs.

You talk juſt in the ſame manner of the Attacks that followed, for you tell us that the Attack of the firſt Counterſcarp coſt us 4000 men, and that of the ſecond near 5000, tho' the truth is that we did not loſe 900 in both Actions. Moreover it is obſervable, that in all thoſe different occaſions, the beſieged according to your Relations, never loſt but a very inconſiderable number of Officers and Soldiers, for I do not reckon 3000 men you pretend to have loſt in the general Aſſault of the 1*ſt.* of *September*, ſince I have already proved that it never had a being but in your Imagination. Nevertheleſs, after a Siege of two Months, that Garriſon which at firſt conſiſted of 14 or 15000 men, and has ſuffered ſo little in all the Attacks, is according to your Gazett of the 10*th.* of *September reduced to* 5003 *Soldiers, of which there are but* 2300 *in a condition to Fight*, while thoſe poor Confederates of whom you barbarouſly kill and wound upwards of 40000 foot, are yet ſtrong enough to take

take *Namur* within ſight of an Army of 100000 men, who dares not attack them.

I will not inſiſt in this place to prove that the loſs of the beſieged has been far greater than that of the Beſiegers, tho I could eaſily convince you of it, deſiring you only to reflect on the great Fire of our Cannons and of our Bombs, and upon the good ſucceſs of our Attacks; neither will I reflect on the extraordinary praiſes you beſtow on the Garriſon, ſaying, *that they have made the moſt glorious defence that ever was heard of.* Others will put you in mind that we only began to batter the Caſtle in order to make a breach on the 17*th.* of *Auguſt*, and that they deſired to capitulate on the 1*ſt.* of *September.* tho we had not as yet taken any of their Works, but only the Counterſcarp of 2 Forts. For my part, Sir, I am willing to grant, you, that the beſieged have done as much as it was natural to believe they would do; they did Capitulate at a time when they had loſt all hopes of relief, at a time when the Breaches were ſo large, and the ſmall remainder of the Garriſon ſo tyred and ſo diſhearten'd, that unleſs

they would have run the hazard of being taken by Storm, they could not have ſuſtain'd a ſecond Attack. Moreover, I will grant you, if you will have it ſo, that they have defended themſelves like *Hero's*, ſince that will place the Princes who have Triumph'd over their Reſiſtance above the degree of *Hero's*.

What may be ſaid without flattering any Body is, that it is no ſmall mortification for your Court to be convinced by the loſs of *Namur*, that the Confederates can take Towns, as well as the *French*. The World has beheld a Train of Artillery at this Siege far ſuperior to any your King has ever been able to aſſemble at any of the Sieges he has made; Ingeneers who have immediately found the weak ſide of the place; and what ſeems almoſt incredible, a Caſtle taken in Ten Days time, which your Garriſon had boaſted they would defend three Months. It has beheld our Infantry, performing all their Attacks with the utmoſt Vigour, and maintaining the Poſts they had taken with an equal Bravery. It has alſo ſeen the *Engliſh*

liſh march with ſo much undauntedneſs, that we may aſſure our ſelves that for the future, whenever your Forces ſhall Engage with them, they will conclude themſelves vanquiſhed before they Fight. But that which is yet far more ſurpriſing, (though it is no Novelty to us,) the World has beheld a King there, whoſe ſacred Life is ſo precious to Us, expoſing his Perſon every Moment, viſiting the Trenches twice every day, preſent in all the Attacks, and by an Indefatigable care Triumphing over Difficulties which offered themſelves in Crouds. In ſhort, it has beheld an undaunted Elector, paſſing whole Nights in the Trenches, and ſharing the Fatigues and Perils of the Siege with his Soldiers.

Theſe without doubt are ſtrong Arguments to oblige your Court to fear the continuation of the War; but yet theſe are not the only Reaſons they have to fear, ſince the *Low Countrys* are not the only place in which *France* has appeared inferiour to her Enemies. She has abandon'd part of her Conqueſts in *Catalonia*. She has labour'd un-

der ſtrange diſquiets for her Army in *Germany*, even ſo far as to reckon its having been able to paſs the *Rhine* without being beaten as a kind of Victory. Inſine you have loſt *Cazal*, a place of the utmoſt conſequence which you had Bought and Fortified with ſo much Treaſure, and in which you had ſuch a Noble Train of Artillery. You have not been happier on the Sea-ſide. All your Coaſts allarmed from *Nice* to *Dunkirk*, your Maritime Provinces ruin'd by the Marches and Countermarches of your Forces, and of your Milicias, St. *Malo*, *Calis* and *Grandville* Bombarded: Your Trade in the two Seas ruined, and your Fleet diſarmed and ſhut up in *Toulon*, are ſpeaking Inſtances of your weakneſs, which even you, Sir, (and that ſpeaks all) dare not deny.

If you do but caſt your Eyes on the Future, it looks far worſe yet. It is moſt certain that the great Events of this Campaign will increaſe the Union of the Confederates, and will induce them to proſecute the War with more Vigour than ever. Beſides thoſe that are acquainted with the interior ſtate of *France*, who

who know the miſery of the People, and to what degree the *Finances* are exhauſted will hardly be perſuaded that they can be able to reſiſt the Forces of the Confederates much longer. Therefore ſince you ſeem to be acquainted with the Miniſters, I will tell you like a Friend, that you will do well to adviſe them, to diſpoſe your Court as ſpeedily as can be, to be ſatisfy'd with a reaſonable Peace, for otherwiſe they may chance to be reduced to accept leſs advantageous Conditions. I am,

Sir,

Sept. the 25th. 1695.

Yours, &c.

FINIS.